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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY IN PENNSYLVANIA FOR
DEFECTIVE STREETS
HENRY S. SAHM*

In Pennsylvania municipalities are held liable for injuries from negligent
failure to keep streets in a reasonably safe condition.' Tht courts reason that where
municipal corporations are invested with exclusive authority and control over the
streets within their city limits and with means for their construction and repair, a
duty arises to the public from the nature of the powers granted to keep the streets
in a reasonably safe condition for tht ordinary use to which they are subjected, and
a corresponding liability exists on the part of the municipality to respond in damages to those injured by a neglect to perform the duty.2 However, a municipality's
duty to maintain streets is primary3 whereas its duty to maintain sidewalks is sec4
ondary.
A municipality is under an implied duty to maintain its streets' in a proper
state of repair, and the fact that another may be sued due to an injury on a street
does not prevent one from instituting an action against the municipality.,

A study of the many cases on this subject will disclose that the decisions have
established and imposed these obligations upon the municipal authorities:
(1)

Streets must be constructed in a reasonably safe manner, and to this end,

ordinary care must be exercised.
*B.S., Lehigh University, 1931; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1936; member of Lackawanna County Bar; Assistant City Solicitor of Scranton.
lGood v. Philadelphia, 335 Pa. 13, 6A (2d) 101 (1939); McGlinn v. Philadelphia, 322 Pa.
478, 186 At!. 747 (1936); Norbeck v. Philadelphia, 224 Pa. 30, 73 Atl. 179 (1909) ; Fritsch v.
Allegheny, 91 Pa. 226 (1879); Heinz v. Pittsburgh, 137 Pa. Super. 603, 10A (2d) 100 (1939)
Rufo 2 v. Philadelphia, 58 Pa. Super. 638 (1915).
Bucher v. Sunbury, 216 Pa. 89, 64 At!. 906 (1906); Brookville Borough v. Arthurs, 130
Pa. 501, 18 Atd. 1076 (1890); Rigony v. Schuylkill County, 103 Pa. 382 (1893); Rapho Township v. Moore, 68 Pa. 404 (1871).
8Lawrence v. Scranton, 284 Pa. 215, 130 At!. 428 (1925).
4Briggs v. Philadelphia, 316 Pa. 48, 173 Atl. 316 (1934); Bruder v. Philadelphia, 302 Pa.
378, 153 Atl, 725 (1931).
5The use of the term "street'.
includes driveways, sidewalks and crosswalks unless otherwise
specified. As to grass plots, see Schramm v. Pittsburgh, 337 Pa. 65, 9A (2d) 373 (1939).
OBrobston v. Darby, 290 Pa. 331, 138 At. 849 (1927); Laurence v. Scranton, 284 Pa. 215,
130 At. 428, 41 A.L.R. 454 (1925). See Short v. Carbondale, 249 Pa. 564, 95 At. 254 (1915);
Brinkos v. McKeesport, 136 Pa. Super. 526, 7A (2d) 516 (1939).
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(2) They must at all times be kept in a reasonably safe condition insofar as
by the exercise of ordinary diligence and supervision. However, in perbe
may
forming this duty, the city is not bound to provide against the possibility of an accident, nor would a mere error in judgment in laying out the way or adopting the
plan be negligence.7
Consequently, in order to recover for injuries sustained because of the defective condition of a street, a plaintiff must show: A d-efective condition such as to
create liability8 and actual or constructive notice to the municipality of the defective
condition of the street, before the accident," or that the defect was created by the
municipality. 10 Where the obstruction is one created by a licensee, it seems that
the municipality is not liable for the licensee's negligence where the permit is
granted for a proper and lawful purpose." But it may be liable for its own negligence in failing to make safe a dangerous condition after knowledge or notice of
the fact. 12 To create a cause of action there must also have been sufficient time to
3
and the defective condition must be
put the street in a reasonably safe1condition'
4
injury.
the
of
cause
the proximate
15
The plaintiff must be free of contributory negligence and by Act of Assembly, notice of the injury and a concise statement of the cause thereof must be given
the proper municipal authorities.1 6

These duties, which the law places on a municipality, cannot be transferred
to another. A municipality cannot delegate the construction and care of its streets
and sidewalks to a private individual or corporation, or even to a quasi-public corporation, and thereby evade its responsibility for such care and supervision. The
duty to keep public streets in a reasonably safe condition for travel devolves pri7

Levene v. Pittsburgh, 252 Pa. 181, 97 Atil. 392 (1916).
8Burns v. Pittsburgh, 320 Pa. 92, 181 Atl. 487 (1935); Bean v. Philadelphia, 260 Pa. 278,

727 (1918); McDonald v. Philadelphia, 248 Pa. 145, 93 At. 959 (1915).
103 Atil.
9
Dress v. Harrisburg, 287 Pa. 157, 134 At. 400 (1926) ; Laurence v. Scranton, 284 Pa. 215,
130 At. 428 (1925) ; Timlin v. Scranton, 139 Pa. Super. 503, 12A (2d) 502 (1939).
10Rowland v. Philadelphia, 202 Pa. 50, 51 At. 589 (1902); Burger v. Philadelphia,

196

Pa. 441, 46 Atd. 262 (1900).
1ILevenite v. Lancaster, 215 Pa. 576, 64 At. 782 (1906); Susquehanna Depot v. Simmons,
112 Pa. 384, 5 Atd. 434 (1886).
12Meyers v. Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 159, 66 At. 251, 10 LRA (NS) 678 (1907).
v. Berwick, 218 Pa. 265, 67 Ati. 347 (1907).
l3Yeager
4

1 Dunkerton v. Borough of North Braddock, 330 Pa. 89, 198 At. 677 (1938); Hoffman v.

McKeesport, 303 Pa. 548, 154 At. 925 (1931).
15Brown v. Philadelphia, 267 Pa. 183, 110 At. 164 (1920); Buchanan v. Grove City, 86 Pa.

Super. 178 (1925).

As to the care required of children or persons under a disability, see Mulligan

v. Homestead Borough, 243 Pa. 361, 90 At. 71 (1914).

As to knowledge of the defect or danger,

see Bookwalter v. Mt. Union, 258 Pa. 209, 101 At. 953 (1917). In regard to a choice of ways
see Smith v. Pittsburgh, 338 Pa. 216, 12A (2d) 788 (1940) ; Watts v. Plymouth, 255 Pa. 185,
99 At. 470 (1916).
lOAct of 1937, P.L. 2547, 53 P.S. 2774; Lutz v. Scranton, 140 Pa. Super. 139, 13A (2d)

121 (1940).
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marily upon the municipality itself.1 7 In Beloud v. Sayre,18 a sidewalk was left in
a defective condition by a contractor who worked on a building abutting thereon.
In a suit against the borough alleging failure to remove the defect the court held
that liability existed for injury incurred thereby by the plaintiff.
Where streets are traversed by trolley tracks a street railway is under an implied duty, even in the absence of a contract, ordinance or statute, to keep in proper
repair the portions of a highway occupied by its track. The municipality is ab-solved in such cases, as against the street railway company, from liability for injuries caused by defects in such portions, as the railway company is primarily
liable. 9 Of course, the plaintiff can sue and recover from either the municipality
or the street railway company, but as between the municipality and street railway
company, the latter is primarily liable.
The municipality's duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain streets free
from highway defects extends to public alleys and courts. However, what constitutes reasonable care in maintaining alleys and courts may be less care than that
20
required in the case of streets.
No precise statement can be made which will categorically determine what
specific condition in a street is such as to show negligence. In general, the question
whether a street is or is not defective must be one of fact and not of law. It depends on a great variety of circumstances, which it is impracticable to synthesise
into a legal proposition. For instance, a better and safer condition of roads and
walks may reasonably be expected and required in the summer than in the winter
time, in populous cities than in unfrequented districts. Much may depend upon
the means at command, upon general usage, upon the question of whether the defect is the result of a sudden accident or has been long neglected and whether any
prior accident has resulted from the same defect.
As to roadways, if dangerous excavations are made or if dangerous obstructions or conditions21 are allowed to remain in the highway, no matter by whom
created, the municipality must fill them up, guard them, light them, or otherwise
warn travelers against them.22 It must keep its highways in a reasonably safe condition for travel by night as well as by day, by those using them in a proper manner
and use reasonable care to that end. The same measure of diligence requires that
17 Malone v. Union Paving Co., 306 Pa. 117, 159 At. 21 (1932); Scott v. Erie, 297 Pa, 344,
147 At. 68 (1929). Compare these cases with Nelson v. Duquesne, Light Co., 338 Pa. 37, 12A
(2d) 299 (1940) ; Briggs v. Philadelphia, 316 Pa. 48, 173 Ad. 316 (1934).
1856 Pa. Super. 215 (1914); Compare with Brinkos v. McKeesport, 136 Pa. Super. 526,
7A (2d) 516 (1939).
19Brobston v. Darby, 290 Pa. 331, 135 Ad. 849 (1927); Aikert v. Philadelphia, 9 Pa. Super.
502 (1899).
20Musick v. Latrobe, 184 Pa. 375, 39 Atd. 226 (1898).
21Tubbs v. Berwick, 262 Pa. 203, 105 At. 57 (1918).
2ZBirmingham v. Dorer, 3 Brewster 69 (1868).
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a municipality must clear its highway of obstructions,2 8 no matter from what causes
they may have come there. 24 This duty extends to streets accepted and recognized
by the city as such to the same extent as those regularly laid out by the city authorities.25
The liability for defective streets extends to defects in crosswalks for the
accommodation of pedestrians in crossing from one side of a street to another.
Crosswalks extend the whole distance between the extended boundary lines of intersecting streets, where they meet the sidewalks. The municipal corporation is
under a duty to construct and maintain in a reasonably safe condition the street
crossing. 25 However, maintaining open gutters of suitable size, at street crossings,
is not negligence, where they are a common and approved method of construc27
tion.
Given a dangerous condition in or close to a street, the municipality becomes
burdened with a duty, to exercise reasonable care to discover the condition and
make it safe; 28 and this is so, even though the caus' of danger is lawful2 9 or the
dangerous condition was wholly the act of a third person.30 In fact, where an
opening was made in a street under an invalid or unauthorized permit, it was held
that the person making such an opening was a trespasser, and if his work rendered
the street dangerous, it is the duty of the municipality, having notice of its condition, to protect the public.8 1
While it is not necessary in every case to guard the sides of a street closed to
traffic, it is necessary to take such precautions as will reasonably safeguard the public.3 2 In such situations a municipality may rope off any part of a street it deems
unsafe, and if such barrier is clearly visible to persons driving at night, exercising
due care, there is no municipal liability in case of injury.83 In a recent case it was
stated that highways are primarily for public travel and as a consequence must be
kept in condition reasonably safe for use by vehicles. When an extraordinary use
of the highway is made it is necessary to give warning of the dangerous condition
created. Just what warning should be given under the circumstances of the par23

McLaughlin v. Corry, 77 Pa. 109 (1875); Norristown v. Moyer, 67 Pa. 355 (1871).
24Kost v. Ashland Borough, 236 Pa. 164, 84 At. 691 (1912); (injury from fall of pole
erected
2 5 by light company).
Ackerman v. Williamsport, 227 Pa. 591, 76 At. 421 (1910).
26Chilton v. Carbondale, 160 Pa. 463, 28 At. 833 (1894); Easton v. Neff, 102 Pa. 474
(1883) ; Cf. McConway v. Philadelphia, 209 Pa. 236, 58 At. 358 (1904); Wright v. Lancaster,
276, 52 At!. 245 (1902).
203 Pa.
227 Canavan v. Oil City, 183 Pa. 611, 38 At. 1096 (1898).
SO'Malley v. Borough of Parsons, 191 Pa. 612, 43 At!. 384 (1899).
2
9Ziegler v. Philadelphia, 19 Phila. 400 (1889).
'3ONelson v. Duquesne Light Co., 338 Pa. 37, 12A (2d) 299 (1940); Bradford v. Downs,
126 Pa. 122, 17 At!.884 (1889).
SIBoyle v. Hazleton, 171 Pa. 167, 33 At!. 142 (1895); Birmingham v. Dorer, 3 Brewster 69
(1868).

32Whitman v. Stipp, 270 Pa. 401, 113 Atl. 567 (1921); O'Malley v. Parsons, 191 Pa. 612,
43 At. 384 (1899).
ZSClamper v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 385, 124 At. 132 (1924).
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ticular case is for a jury to determine."' In Cora v. Borough of Kingston" it was
held that lights in the vicinity of a rope barrier erected across a highway, together
with red lanterns placed on a barrier, was sufficient warning that the road was
closed.
In connection with a municipality's duty to light its streets, a distinction must
be made between streets which are safe for travel and streets which are unsafe, due
to obstructions or excavations.86 In the latter case, lights or other precautions must
be used.8 7 In the absence of charter or statutory requirements, a city is under no
obligation to keep its streets lighted, though it has the appliances therefor, 8 where
the streets are reasonably safe for travel, 89 and it may leave them unlighted and not
be held liable in damages to a person injured because of such lack of lighting
0
facilities.4
In Canavan v. Oil City,41 the court said that "as to whether sufficient
light was provided by the city on the night of the accident, we may
briefly say there was no legal obligation on a municipality to light its
streets when their construction is reasonably safe for travel. This is
solely a question for the municipal legislature. It may do many things
not enjoined by the law to promote the general well being and comfort of the citizen; but, in not doing that which no statute commands,
negligence cannot be imputed to it. This, however, in no sense relieves it from the duty of that ordinary care which requires that temporary txcavations for building purposes should be exposed by proper
light, or that temporary obstructions of the street by building material
should be made conspicuous in the same way."
SNOW AND ICE CASES

A municipality is not liable for injuries resulting from the general slipperiness
of its streets or its sidewalks occasioned by a recent precipitation and freezing of
rain or snow. The reasoning behind this rule is that persons who undertake to
pass over the sidewalks of a street made unsafe or dangerous by freezing of recent
falls of snow or rain know their condition and assume the risk, and also it is too
great a burden to impose such a duty.' 2 Yet the rule does not extend so far as to
S4Geiger v. Dowdy, 111 Pa. Super. 485, 170 At. 420 (1934) (rope suspended across highway).
85300 Pa. 159, 150 At. 384 (1930).
86Canavan v. Oil City, 183 Pa. 611, 38 Atd. 1096 (1898).
a7id at 617, 38 At. at 1098.
8ibid.

9Horner v. Philadelphia, 194 Pa. 542, 45 At. 330 (1900) (stumbling over fire plug due to
defective lighting).
400'Rourke v. Washington, 304 Pa. 78, 155 Atd. 100 (1931).
41183 Pa. 611, 38 At!. 1096 (1898).
42McDonough v.Munhall Boro., 331 Pa. 468, 200 Ad. 638 (1938) ; Spencer v. Philadelphia
276 Pa. 310, 120 At. 131 (1923); Llewellyn v. Wilkes-Barre, 254 Pa. 196, 98 At. 886 (1916);
Gross v. Pittsburgh, 243 Pa. 525, 90 At. 365 (1914); Holbert v. Philadelphia, 221 Pa. 266.
70 At. 746 (1908).
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protect the city from liability for injuries caused to a person by slipping on ice in a
street or sidewalk, due to antecedent negligence where it has accumulated because
of a defect in a street or walk by reason of the neglect to construct and maintain
suitable drains to carry off the water.4" However, the municipality's liability in
such cases is secondary and supplemental to that of the occupiers or owners af th'
property.
So, too, the city may be liable if the snow and ice exists in ridges and little
hills and the pavement is permitted to remain in that condition for a length of time
sufficient to charge the city with knowledge of the situation and the condition is not
44
remedied.
In summation, it may be stated that the liability of a municipality for injuries
to travelers caus'ed by accumulations of ice and snow on its streets depends on
whether it has exercised reasonable care and diligence to keep its streets reasonably
safe for travelers who are using due care, and its liability should be made to depend upon what is reasonable under all the circumstances paying attention to cli5
matic conditions.4
NOTICE

In order to impose liability upon the municipality for defects not created by
it, 41 it must have actual knowledge of the defect or notice of such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonable person to such knowledge 47 and a sufficient
opportunity to repair. 4 8 Although a municipality need not seek defects, it must be
49
vigilant to observe them when they are visible.
Whether notice to particular municipal officers or agents will be imputed to
the municipality depends on whether such municipal officer is bound to act on
such knowledge.5 0 When a municipal officer is bound to act on knowledge, and
the law fixes no channel through which it must reach him in order to impose the
duty, the knowledge gained by him as an individual must be imputed to him as an
officer. Notice of the defects cannot be brought home to the municipality by evidence that the person who was the chief burgess at the time of the accident had,
before he was elected burgess, called the attention of the chief of police to such
43Whitton v. Gable Co., 331 Pa. 429, 200 Atl. 644 (1938) ; Holbert v. Philadelphia, 221 Pa.
266, 70 At. 266 (1908).
44
Wyman v. Philadelphia, 175 Pa. 117; 34 Atl. 621 (1896); 'Neistadt v. Philadelphia, 138

Pa. Super. 200, 10A (2d) 77 (1939); Taylor v. Philadelphia, 138 Pa. Super. 194, 10A (2d)
75 (1939).
46McCracken v. Curwensville Borough. 309 Pa. 98, 163 At. 217 (1932). Accord Goodman
v. Corn
Exchange Bank, 331 Pa. 587, 200 At. 642 (1938).
46
Text to note 30 supra et seq.
47
Lohr v. Borough of Phillipsburg, 156 Pa. 246, 27 Atl. 133 (1895).
48Dress v. Harrisburg, 287 Pa. 157, 134 Atil. 400 (1926).
49
Malone v. Union Paving Co., 306 Pa. 111, 159 At. 21 (1932) ; Rogers v. Williamsport,
199 Pa. 450, 49 At. 293 (1901); Mauch Chunk Borough v. Kline, 100 Pa. 119 (1882).
SOCanfield v. East Stroudsburg, 19 Pa. Super. 649 (1902).
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defects.51 Knowledge by a councilman is not notice to the municipality" but
5
express notice to a councilman, as such, is. 3
Notice as applied in these types of cases may be constructive.5 4 Constructive
notice of a defective condition in streets will be imputed to a city if the condition
has existed for sufficient time to have enabled it by the exercise of reasonable diligence to have acquired knowledge of such condition.55
Negligence in not knowing of the dangerous condition may be shown by circumstances.5 6 Constructive notice can only rest on a defect of such character as to
be generally noticed, that is, as could and naturally would be seen by travelers using
the street or walk.6 7 Where a defect in a highway is so slight as not to attract the
attention of pedestrians, it is likewise too unimportant to require the municipality
5
to observe it.
8 The particular circumstances of each case are in the ultimate
analysis, the real test as to whether there was constructive notice. 59
In particular situations (as distinguished from ice and snow cases) governed
largely by the circumstances of the case at bar, notice has been imputed where the
defect existed five to six weeks in the case of a sidewalk. 60 Where the defect
existed "a week or more," the court said, "we cannot say that there was no notice." 61
The existence of a defect in a sidewalk "for years" was held to be constructive
notice. 62 Where a city let out a contract for the construction of a sewer in a street
and a person was injured one week thereafter by falling into the trench, a jury was
permitted to find that the city had constructive notice of the existence of the
trench. 6" Constructive notice was attributed to a city where a hole fifteen inches by
-twenty-four inches and six inches deep alongside a street car track existed for four
months.6 4 So too, where gutter stones were negligently left in a street for almost
SILohr v. Borough of Phillipsburg, 156 Pa. 246, 27 At. 133 (1893).
2

5 Frazier v. Borough of Butler, 172 Pa. 407, 33 Ad. 691 (1896).
53ibid.
54
Maric v. Pittsburgh, 328 Pa. 253, 194 At. 902 (1937); Emery v. Pittsburgh, 275 Pa. 551,
119 Atd.
603 (1923).
t5

Dress v. Harrisburg, 287 Pa. 157, 134 At. 400 (1926); Laurence v. Scranton, 284 Pa.
215, 130 At. 428, 41 ALR 454 (1925); Llewellyn v. Wilkes-Barre, 254 Pa. 196, 98 At. 886
(1916); Norbeck v. Philadelphia, 224 Pa. 30, 73 Atd. 179 (1909); Duncan v. Philadelphia, 173
Pa. 550, 34 At!. 235 (1896).
56McKelvey v. Juniata, 265 Pa. 56, 108 Atd. 205 (1919).
7

5 Emery v. Pittsburgh, 275 Pa. 551, 119 At. 603 (1923) distinguishing Davis v. Shenandoah,
273 Pa. 501, 117 At!. 207 (1922); Burns v. Bradford, 137 Pa. 361, 20 Atd. 997, 11 L.R.A. 726
(1891).

5598Malone v. Union Paving Co., 306 Pa. 11l, 159 At. 21 (1932).
Boyle v. Mahanoy City, 187 Pa. 1, 40 Atl. 1093 (1898); Rife v. Middletown, 32 Pa.
Super. 68 (1906); Boehm v. Bethlehem, 4 Pa. Super. 385 (1897). See note to Springer v. Phila.,
12 Atl. 490 (1888).

60Philadelphia v. Smith, 23 W.N.C. 242, 16 At!. 493 (1889).
61Butcher v. Philadelphia, 202 Pa. 1, 51 At!. 330 (1902).

62

Davis v. Shenandoah, 273 Pa. 501, 117 Atl. 207 (1922).

63
4

Gerber v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. Super. 119 (1915).

6 Murtha v. Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super. 426, 171 At!. 399 (1934).
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two months."1 Six weeks is a long enough period to visit constructive notice upon
authorities of a defect in a sidewalk. 66 Where the defective condition of a flagstone existed five years, the municipality was held liable. 67 Where a sidewalk was
unsafe for some two months, the city was chargeable with notice. 6 8 Constructive
notice was imputed where an open meter box twenty inches in diameter and set in
a sidewalk was not repaired within twenty-four hours. 69
On the other hand, defects which have existed for the following periods have
been held not to have been in existence a sufficient tim'e to impute notice: A defective sidewalk which had been repaired eighteen days before the accident;7 0 a
hole in a sidewalk, covered by a board so as to be invisible, which had existed for
twenty-four hours. 71
Where there was evidence that a defect in a much used pedestrian platform
owned by the city existed for three days before the injury it was held to be a
question for the jury.72
The cases above had reference to defects in streets other than those caused by
ice and snow. However, the rules as to constructive notice likewise apply in the
case of ice and snow with the qualification that the requited time element is generally shorter. In two cases involving snow and ice a verdict for the plaintiff was
sustained on four or five days "continuance of a dangerous highway condition." 73
Another held three to four days notice was sufficient. 74 In Wyman v. Philadelphia,75 only thirty-four hours intervened from the end of the last snowfall to
the injury. The municipality's point for binding instructions was declined and a
verdict rendered for the plaintiff which was affirmed. In still another case, the
municipality was not charged with constructive notice where the elapsed time between the end of the snow storm and the injury was twenty-seven hours. 76 The
court pointed out that in considering what is a reasonable time, the fact that conditions were general throughout the confines of a large city due to a heavy fall of
snow was a factor.
A study of all the cases shows that no general rule in snow and ice cases can
be stated. A distinction must be made between parties primarily and secondarily
65Symons v. Philadelphia, 19 Phila. 417 (1889).
6

6 Dunn v. Westview Borough, 70 Pa. Super. 228, 65 P.J.L. 749 (1918).
67Emery v. Pittsburgh, 275 Pa. 551, 119 Atl. 603, 70 P.J.L. 533 (1923).

6SMcDonald v. Scranton, 28 Lacka. Jur. 288 (1925).
Waltz v. Dickson City, 24 Lacka. Jur. 124 (1922).
"ORogers v. Williamsport, 199 Pa. 450, 49 At]. 293 (1901).
?lYeager v. Berwick, 218 Pa. 265, 67 At. 347 (1907).
72Teske v. Pittsburgh, 110 Pa. Super. 274, 168 Atl. 323 (1933).
73Beebe v. Philadelphia, 312 Pa. 214, 167 Atl. 570 (1933); Llewellyn v. Wilkes-Barre, 254
Pa. 196, 98 At. 886 (1916); Meyers v. Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 159, 66 Atl. 251 (1907).
74Reed v. Schuylkill Haven, 22 Pa. Super. 27 (1903).
75175 Pa. 117, 34 Atl. 621 (1896).
76Beebe v. Philadelphia, 312 Pa. 214, 167 At. 570 (1933).
69
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liable. In the latter situation, a longer time must elapse in order to impute notice. 7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court sums up constructive notice in this type of case as
follows: -**** it is impossible to fix any definite time as a minimum from which
a jury should or should not be allowed to find constructive notice of such a defect

*** "78

In conclusion, it may be stated that, in the construction and maintenance of
its sidewalks, crosswalks and roadways, a municipality is answerable in damages for
a lack of ordinary or reasonable care. It is not liable as an insurer, nor chargeable
in consequence of the existence of latent defects which ordinary skill and diligence
would not detect, 79 Neither is it expected to make extraordinary exertions, nor to
make use of the very best means and appliances; but it is held to the same rule of
diligence which is expected of private persons in the conduct of any business involving a like danger to others; 0 and whether it has exercised this degree of diligence is, in general, a question of fact for the jury. 8'
SCRANTON, PA.

HENRY S. SAHM

77ibid.
78ibid.
"tFitzpatrick v. Borough of Darby, 184 Pa. 645, 39 Ad. 545 (1898) ; Duncan v. Philadelphia,
173 Pa. 550, 34 At. 235 (1896).
80Levine v. Pittsburgh, 252 Pa. 181, 97 Atd. 392 (1916); Norbeck v. Philadelphia, 224 Pa.

30, 73 At. 179 (1909); Burns v. Bradford, 137 Pa. 361, 20 Atl. 997, 11 L.R.A, 726 (1891);
Rapho v. Moore, 68 Pa. 404 (1871).
SiHenry v. Williamsport, 179 Pa. 465, 47 At. 740 (1901); O'Brien v. Borough of Jeanette,
128 Pa. Super. 443, 194 At. 314 (1937) ; see generally German v. McKeesport, 137 Pa. Super.
41, 8A (2d) 437 (1939).

